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GO HOME, STRANGER: AN ANALYSIS OF UNEQUAL
WORKERS' COMPENSATION DEATH BENEFITS TO
NONRESIDENT ALIEN BENEFICIARIES
ADAM S. HERSH
W hile working on a Georgia construction project, Jos6 Morales
fell from a twenty-two story scaffold to his death.1 Morales'
wife and sons filed for death benefits under the state's workers' com-
pensation law.2 While most dependents would be eligible for
$100,000,1 Morales' wife and children were limited to $1,000 because
they were citizens and residents of Mexico when Morales died. 4 Geor-
gia workers' compensation law, as well as the law in sixteen other
states, explicitly allows for drastic caps on death benefits to nonresi-
dent alien beneficiaries.5 When a worker dies in Alabama, for instance,
his or her nonresident alien beneficiary is barred from recovery. 6
1. Barg-Wagener Constr. Co. v. Morales, 429 S.E.2d 671, 672 (Ga.), cert. denied, 114 S.
Ct. 579 (1993); see also Bill Rankin, Court Endorses $1000 Limit on Death Benefit Restriction
on Foreigners, ATLANTA CONSr., May 29, 1993, at BI.
2. Morales, 429 S.E.2d at 672.
3. GA. CODE ANN. § 34-9-265(d) (Harrison 1993).
4. Id.
5. Section 34-9-265(b)(5) of the Georgia Code provides:
If death results instantly from an accident arising out of and in the course of employ-
ment .. the compensation under this chapter shall be as follows:
(5) If the employee leaves dependents who are not citizens or residents of the United
States or the Dominion of Canada at the time of the accident, the amount of compen-
sation shall not in any case exceed $1,000.00.
See Appendix to this Comment, which lists each state's death benefit provisions for nonresi-
dent alien beneficiaries.
A nonresident alien is a person who is not a citizen of the United States, is not a lawful
immigrant of the United States, and does not reside in the United States. A workers' compensa-
tion dependent or beneficiary is a person who, in accordance with a state's workers' compensa-
tion law, "look[s] to and relie[s] on the contributions of the worker for support and
maintenance in whole or in part, in accordance with such person's social position and accus-
tomed mode of life .... " 82 Am. JutR. 2v Workers' Compensation § 185 (1962).
6. Section 25-5-82 of the Alabama Code provides:
Compensation for the death of an employee shall be paid only to dependents who, at
the time of the death of the injured employee, were actually residents of the United
States. No right of action to recover damages for the death of an employee shall exist
in favor or for the benefit of any person who was not a resident of the United States
at the time of the death of such employee.
ALA. CODE § 25-5-82 (1993).
WORKERS' COMPENSATION
Florida, Delaware, and several other states provide for a 5007o reduc-
tion.7
This Comment analyzes the constitutionality of these death benefit
systems and suggests methods to improve them. Part I details the tra-
ditional justifications courts have used to uphold workers' compensa-
tion statutes that deny full benefits to nonresident alien beneficiaries.
Part II addresses the Equal Protection Clause and Supremacy Clause
issues raised by these statutes, and suggests that states take an activist
stance to invalidate them. Part III analyzes access to courts and ar-
gues that many jurisdictions have wrongly granted employers immu-
nity from liability while denying plaintiffs the right to compensation.
Part IV discusses model statutes which may be used to distribute
death benefits rationally and equitably.
I. TRADITIONAL JUSTIFICATIONS FOR DENYING NONRESIDENT ALIEN
BENEFICIARIES FULL RECOVERY
Five justifications have emerged as bases for denying full compen-
sation to nonresident alien beneficiaries: lack of standing,8 welfare
considerations, 9 cost of living differentials, 10 administrative conven-
ience, and parity with federal statutes. 12 Historically, courts have
barred nonresident alien beneficiary claims for full death benefits 3 be-
cause the beneficiaries lacked standing to challenge the constitutional-
ity of the benefit denial.' 4 Proponents of this principle assert that
7. Section 440.16(c)(7) of Florida Statutes provides:
[T]he judge of compensation claims may, at the option of the judge of compensation
claims, or upon the application of the insurance carrier, commute all future install-
ments of compensation to be paid to [nonresident alien dependents other than Canadi-
ans] by paying or causing to be paid to them one-half of the commuted amount of
such future installments of compensation ... and provided further that compensation
to dependents referred to in this subsection shall in no case exceed $50,000.
FLA. STAT. § 440.16(c)(7) (1993).
The maximum amount of benefits available to all other dependents is $100,000. FLA. STAT.
§ 440.16(b) (1993). See also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 2333(a) (1993), and the Appendix to this
Comment.
8. See infra notes 15-31 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 32-33 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 34-36 and accompanying text.
1I. See infra note 37 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 38-44 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 18-26 and accompanying text.
14. Barge-Wagener Constr. Co. v. Morales, 429 S.E.2d 671, 673 (Ga.) (denying nonresident
alien beneficiaries' challenge to Georgia's $1000 maximum on death benefit payments because
"[alliens outside the borders of the United States arc subject to their own nations' laws and
cannot invoke the protections reserved for citizens and residents of the United States"), cert.
denied, 114 S. Ct. 579 (1993); see also Pedrazza v. Sid Flemming Contractor, Inc., 607 P.2d 597,
600 (N.M. 1980).
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death benefits under workers' compensation are the exclusive property
of the beneficiary, 5 separate from the rights and remedies vested in
the worker.' 6 As the United States Supreme Court has noted, a state's
decision to provide death benefits:
fundamentally chang[es] the rights of relatives and dependents of a
person killed in the course of employment, and must be considered
as vesting in the relatives of the deceased employee a new and
independent property right, which they do not take by way of
succession through the employee, but which first exists in themselves
as a separate right. 7
Because the dependent's right to death benefits does not derive
from the employee's right to compensation, a deceased employee's
standing cannot be transferred to family members wishing to chal-
lenge the truncated recovery. 8 Moreover, U.S. constitutional guaran-
tees extend only to U.S. citizens and aliens residing within the United
States.' 9 Once nonresident alien beneficiaries are deemed beyond con-
stitutional protection, courts do not discuss the merits of an equal
protection challenge to the residency distinction.20 Even if constitu-
tional protection were to exist, however, the merits of an equal protec-
tion argument may be defeated under a "rational relationship"
analysis 2' by concluding that the residency distinction against aliens
serves legitimate governmental interests.2
An illustration of how courts preclude relief is Pedrazza v. Sid
Fleming Contractor, Inc. ,23 where the New Mexico Supreme Court
15. Alvarez Martinez v. Industrial Comm'n, 720 P.2d 416, 417 (Utah 1986). Utah's work-
ers' compensation statute reducing benefits to nonresident alien beneficiaries was recently re-
pealed. UTAH CODE ANN. § 35-1-72 (1953), repealed by 1993 Utah Laws Ch. 18, § 1.
16. Pedrazza, 607 P.2d at 601.
17. Liberato v. Royer, 270 U.S. 535, 536 (1926).
18. Morales, 429 S.E.2d at 673.
19. Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950); see also De Tenorio v. McGowan, 510
F.2d 92, 101 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 877 (1975).
20. See infra notes 23-26 and accompanying text; see also Alvarez Martinez v. Industrial
Comm'n, 720 P.2d 416, 418 (Utah 1986) (rejecting, without discussing the merits, nonresident
alien beneficiary's equal protection challenge).
21. Under rational relationship review, a statutory scheme will survive a constitutional chal-
lenge provided it is "rationally related" to a legitimate governmental interest. See, e.g., New
York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568 (1979) (applying rational relationship standard
to city's hiring practice); see also McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425 (1961).
22. See, e.g., Jalifi v. Industrial Comm'n, 644 P.2d 1319, 1322 (Ariz. Ct. App.), appeal
dismissed, 459 U.S. 899 (1982). For a discussion of the governmental interests courts have identi-
fied as sufficient to pass the rational basis test, see infra notes 23-37 and accompanying text.
23. 607 P.2d 597 (N.M. 1980).
WORKERS' COMPENSATION
ruled against a mother and her Mexican children who sought compen-
sation after the father died in a job-related industrial accident in the
United States.24 The court stated that because the father's rights and
remedies under workers' compensation were "separate and distinct"
from those of the children's, the children as nonresident aliens were
"beyond the protective reach of the Equal Protection Clause and out-
side of our ability to help their cause on constitutional grounds. '25
Had they resided in the United States when their father died, however,
the alienage distinction would have been applicable, and the children
would have received compensation.26
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has similarly commented on the
residency/nonresidency dichotomy, noting that "[riesident aliens,
lawfully in the United States, are undoubtedly entitled to the equal
protection of the law. It is equally obvious that the Fourteenth
Amendment, by its own terms, has no application to aliens not within
the jurisdiction of the United States." 27
In 1982, the Court considered the issue of territorial application of
the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause in Plyler v.
Doe.2 In Plyler, Mexican children who illegally entered the United
States sought injunctive and declaratory relief against their exclusion
from Texas public schools. 29 The State contended that undocumented
aliens were not "persons within the jurisdiction" of Texas and, as a
consequence, had no right to equal protection. 0
In rejecting the State's argument, the Court reaffirmed that both
the Equal Protection Clause and the Due Process Clause of the U.S.
Constitution apply to illegal and legal aliens who are residents of the
United States:
In concludirg that "all persons within the territory of the United
States," including aliens unlawfully present, may invoke the Fifth
and Sixth Amendments to challenge actions of the Federal
Government, we reasoned from the understanding that the
24. Id. at 601.
25. Id. at 600.
26. Id. at 601. The challenged statute stated: "[N]o claim or judgment for compensation
• . . shall accrue to or be recovered by relatives or dependents not residents of the United States
at the time of the injury." N.M. STAT. ANN. § 52-1-52 (Michie 1978). The New Mexico Legisla-
ture has since amended its workers' compensation statutes to allow recovery by nonresident alien
beneficiaries equal to that of other beneficiaries. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 52-1-52 (Michie 1993).
27. De Tenorio v. McGowan, 510 F.2d 92, 101 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 877 (1975)
(citation omitted).
28. 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
29. Id. at 206.
30. Id. at 210.
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Fourteenth Amendment was designed to afford its protection to all
within the boundaries of a State. Our cases applying the Equal
Protection Clause reflect the same territorial theme .... 31
In addition to the territorial rationale, a second argument for deny-
ing recovery to nonresident alien beneficiaries is that workers' com-
pensation helps prevent an employee's dependents from becoming
public charges and joining the welfare rolls due to the financial loss
accompanying a worker's death.32 Consequently, statutes which pro-
hibit death benefits distinguish between resident alien beneficiaries,
who, without full benefits, are in a position to become public charges
in the United States, and nonresident alien beneficiaries, who are not
in danger of becoming public charges in the United States. 3
The third reason courts uphold the validity of these statutes is that
the cost of living in many foreign countries is substantially less than in
the United States.34 If parity were to be established, nonresident alien
dependents might receive compensation greatly exceeding the death
benefit they would receive in their country. Proponents of this argu-
ment claim that overpayment would run counter to the social policies
behind workers' compensation35 and would be inconsistent with the
belief that death benefits are a statutory right of the beneficiary as
opposed to an immutable property right of the decedent worker's es-
tate.
36
The fourth justification is that the reduction in death benefits to
nonresident alien beneficiaries is a practical decision based on admin-
istrative convenience in light of the considerable task of proving the
validity of claims. As one commentator pointed out, "Most of the
special rules [denying death benefits to nonresident alien beneficiaries]
are the result not of any desire to discriminate but of the awkward
problem of proof and continuing administration that is unavoidably
present in these cases."
37
31. Id. at 212 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
32. Jalifi v. Industrial Comm'n, 644 P.2d 1319, 1322 (Ariz. Ct. App.), appeal dismissed,
459 U.S. 899 (1982).
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Alvarez Martinez v. Industrial Comm'n, 720 P.2d 416, 418 (Utah 1986) ("Since the
constitutionality of worker's compensation death benefits must be viewed in light of the laws
and history of this country, the extension of full death benefits to foreign nationals is not consti-
tutionally required.").
36. See Barge-Wagener Constr. Co. v. Morales, 429 S.E.2d 671, 672-73 (Ga.), cert. denied,
114 S. Ct. 579 (1993) (analogizing a decedent's estate's statutorily created right to sue for wrong-
ful death, which is not a property right of the decedent's estate, to the statutorily created right of
dependents to collect workers' compensation death benefits). For a critique of this analogy, see
infra notes 49-63 and accompanying text.
37. 2A ARTHUR LARsoN, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 63.51 at 11-184 (1989).
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A possible fifth justification which has not been raised by courts is
that federal workers' compensation laws, like many of their state
counterparts, also discriminate on the basis of alienage. Several state
statutes are modeled after the Federal Longshoremen's and Harbor
Workers' Compensation Act,38 which provides for a 50q7 reduction of
death benefits based on the dependent's status as a nonresident alien
beneficiary.3 9
The Defense Base Act also provides for 5001o reductions in nonresi-
dent alien dependents' death benefits. ° In Calloway v. Hanson,4 the
Defense Base Act was used to truncate a Salvadoran woman's death
benefits after the death of her husband.4 2 The widow argued that Con-
gress, through the Act, intended that the dependents of United States
citizens receive full death benefits regardless of their nationality or
residency.43 Holding for the Government, the court noted that the lim-
itations in the Defense Base Act were nearly identical to those in the
Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act. 4
II. CHALLENGING THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF UNEQUAL DEATH
BENEFITS THROUGH THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE AND SUPREMACY
CLAUSE
When discussing the constitutionality of state death benefit statutes
which discriminate against nonresident alien beneficiaries, it is impor-
tant to distinguish state constitutional challenges from federal consti-
tutional challenges. As a jurisdictional matter, claims under both
theories wind their way through state court systems, where state
38. 33 U.S.C. § 909 (1988).
39. The Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Act provides:
Aliens: Compensation under this [Act] to aliens, not residents (or about to become
nonresidents) of the United States or Canada shall be the same in amount as provided
for residents, except that dependents in any foreign country shall be limited to surviv-
ing wife and child or children, or if there be no surviving wife or child or children, to
surviving father or mother whom the employee has supported, either wholly or in
part, for the period of one year prior to the date of the injury, and except that the
Secretary [of Labor] may, at his option or upon the application of the insurance car-
rier shall, commute all future installments of compensation to be paid to such aliens
by paying or causing to be paid to them one-half of the commuted amount of such
future installments of compensation as determined by the Secretary [of Labor].
33 U.S.C. § 909(g) (1988).
40. 42 U.S.C. § 1652(b) (1988).
41. 295 F. Supp. 1182 (D. Haw. 1969).
42. Id. at 1183.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 1184 ("It is probably significant to note that the language used in [the Defense
Base Act] was not new language, but will be found almost verbatim in The Longshoremen's and
Harbor Worker's [sic] Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C.A. § 909(g), first enacted March 4, 1927.").
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grounds for relief (equal protection, access to courts) and federal
grounds for relief (equal protection, supremacy of federal laws) are
advanced. This section uses federal equal protection analysis, as a
constitutional floor, to conclude that statutes denying full death bene-
fits to nonresident alien dependents violate fundamental principles of
equity and fairness. In addition, this section demonstrates how, in
limited circumstances, the Supremacy Clause may be invoked to ren-
der these statutes inoperative.4
A. Equal Protection Clause
1. Establishing Standing
Before discussing statutory challenges to discrimination based on al-
ienage, standing for the beneficiaries must be established.4 Courts
usually deny standing in such cases, asserting that death benefits are
property rights of the beneficiary created by statute, rather than prop-
erty rights of the worker.4 7 Consequently, nonresident alien beneficiar-
ies cannot challenge the constitutionality of legislative decisions
curtailing their benefits because they are prohibited from asserting
state or federal constitutional guarantees.4
In recent years, however, a handful of state supreme courts have
questioned the antiquated property notions which have kept alien de-
pendents from their day in court.4 9 In De Ayala v. Florida Farm Bu-
reau Casualty Insurance, the Florida Supreme Court concluded that
death benefits belong to the worker as part of the benefits earned be-
fore the job-related death occurred.50 De Ayala involved death bene-
45. See infra notes 90-109 and accompanying text.
46. See supra notes 15-31 and accompanying text.
47. See supra notes 18-22 and accompanying text.
48. See supra notes 23-26 and accompanying text.
49. See Jurado v. Popejoy, 853 P.2d 669 (Kan. 1993); De Ayala v. Florida Farm Bureau
Casualty Ins., 543 So. 2d 204 (Fla. 1989).
50. 543 So. 2d at 206 ("[W]e do not perceive this case as hinging on the constitutional
rights of the surviving dependents, but on the constitutional rights of the worker, now de-
ceased.").
De Ayala relied in part on a California Supreme Court decision that allowed nonresident de-
pendents to collect death benefits tinder California's workers' compensation system:
The provision for such death benefits, like that for the payment of compensation to
injured employ[ees] themselves, is a regulation of the conditions surrounding the em-
ployment of labor and is to be justified upon similar grounds.
If it may reasonably be thought that the best interests of the state, of the employers of
labor, and of those employed, as well as of the public generally, are promoted by
imposing upon the industry or the public the burden of industrial accident-and some
such theory lies at the bottom of all workmen's compensation statutes-the residence
and citizenship of the injured workman, or (if he shall have met with death) of his
dependents, are factors entirely foreign to the discussion.
Western Metal Supply Co. v. Pillsbury, 156 P. 491, 495 (Cal. 1916) (citation omitted).
1994] WORKERS' COMPENSATION
fits stemming from a job-related accident which killed Maximiano De
Ayala, whose beneficiaries were citizens and residents of Mexico. s1
While the Florida death benefit cap for residents was $100,000, the
beneficiaries challenged the statute limiting them, as nonresident alien
dependents, to $1,000.52 The Florida Supreme Court invalidated the
$1,000 limit, reasoning that the alienage discrimination began the mo-
ment the worker decedent started work as opposed to when the
worker decedent died.13 As a result, the statute violated the worker's
equal protection rights because the worker could not exercise his right
to death benefits as enforced by his beneficiaries.5 4
Unlike courts rejecting the proposition that death benefits belong to
the worker,5" De Ayala took into account how workers' compensation
systems are funded, recognizing that workers' salaries-not just em-
ployers' premiums-pay for compensation insurance entitling employ-
ees to benefits in the event of injury or death.3 6 With so much "sweat
51. DeAyala, 543 So. 2d at 205.
52. The challenged statute stated:
Compensation under this chapter to aliens not residents (or about to become nonresi-
dents) of the United States or Canada shall be the same in amount as provided for
residents, except that dependents in any foreign country shall be limited to surviving
spouse and child or children, or if there be no surviving spouse or child or children, to
surviving father or mother whom the employee has supported, either wholly or in
part, for the period of 1 year prior to the date of the injury, and except that the
deputy commissioner may, at the deputy commissioner's option, or upon the applica-
tion of the insurance carrier, commute all future installments of compensation to be
paid to such aliens by paying or causing to be paid to them one-half of the commuted
amount of such future installments of compensation as determined by the deputy
commissioner, and provided further that compensation to dependents referred to in
this subsection shall in no case exceed $1,000,
FLA. STAT. § 440.16(7) (1983) (emphasis added).
During the claims process in De Ayala, the defendant compensation carrier acknowledged the
severe limitations imposed by the statute: "While I commend you for your efforts on behalf of
the deceased claimant's estate, I cannot (in good conscience) offer you anymore [sic] than is
statutorily allowed. Pursuant to Florida Statute 440.16(7), we cannot pay the estate or personal
representative of the deceased claimant more than the $1,000 allowed." Letter from R. Neil
Durrance, Jr., Workers' Compensation Regional Claims Manager, Florida Farm Bureau Insur-
ance Companies, to Roger N. Messer, counsel for plaintiff beneficiaries (Aug. 28, 1984) (on file
with author).
53. See supra note 50.
54. See supra note 50; see also Jurado v. Popejoy Constr. Co,, 853 P.2d 669 (Kan, 1993).
Jurado involved a nonresident alien beneficiary's challenge to Kansas' $750 cap on death bene-
fits to alien dependents, despite payment of up to $200,000 to every other type of claimant:
Although the death benefit vests after death and is distributed to dependents rather
than the worker, the benefit nevertheless arises out of the employment relationship
and is part of the benefits package that the worker earned before he died. Thus, as a
practical matter, the disparate treatment occurred before [the worker] died.
Jurado, 853 P.2d at 673-74.
55. See supra notes 23-26 and accompanying text.
56. The De Ayala majority stated:
226 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW [Vol. 22:217
equity" built into workers' compensation, "[clommon sense dictates
that [the decedent] should be entitled to the same 'benefits,' regardless
of the residence or status of his dependents." 7 Rather than subscribe
to the bundle-of-rights fiction other courts used, De Ayala found
death benefits inuring from the employer-employee relationship,
meaning that nonresident alien beneficiaries have a right of action de-
rivative of the employee's contract of employment."8
Accord for this position was advanced as early as 1923, when the
Court recognized that death benefits serve an employee's interest in
providing for his or her family.59 In Madera Sugar Pine Co. v. Indus-
trial Accident Commission,6° the Court upheld a provision in Califor-
nia's workers' compensation law requiring payment of death benefits
to nonresident aliens, despite a challenge by the employer on Four-
teenth Amendment due process grounds contending that the state
lacked the authority to grant statutory death benefits to nonresident
alien beneficiaries.6' In reaching its conclusion, the Court emphasized
that the purpose of workers' compensation is to serve the employee's
best interests by seeing that his or her family is protected against loss
of the worker's income.62 The Court in Madera also noted that work-
ers' compensation benefits are analogous to insurance in that the ben-
efits should go "to those to whom the employee would naturally have
made such insurance payable: to himself, although an alien, if he be
disabled; and to those dependent upon his earnings for support, if he
be killed. "63
One of the primary benefits that an employee works for is the satisfaction and well-
being of providing for his or her family. The law did not afford [the deceased worker]
different treatment while he was alive and working. He shared the same "burdens" as
his fellow employees. He paid taxes and contributed to the growth of his company and
the general economy. His labor .. .helped pay for the employer's insurance prem-
iums required under the worker's compensation law.
543 So. 2d at 207.
57. Id. at 206.
58. Id.
59. Madera Sugar Pine Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 262 U.S. 499, 503 (1923).
60. Id.
61. Id. at 504. Madera affirmed on Fourteenth Amendment due process grounds (as op-
posed to Fourteenth Amendment equal protection grounds) the authority of a state legislature to
grant to nonresident alien beneficiaries a statutory death benefit. Id.
62. Id. at 502-03. Justice Sanford explained that:
[T]he compensation to dependents is merely a part of the general scheme of compen-
sation provided by these acts for the loss resulting from the impairment or destruction
of the earning power of an employee caused by an industrial accident, which in case of
his death is paid to those whom he had supported by his earnings and who have suf-
fered direct loss through the destruction of his earning power.
Id.
63. Id. at 503.
WORKERS' COMPENSA TION
2. Variations on Standing as Applied to Nonresident Alien
Dependents
Because each state's standing interpretations differ, federal standing
doctrine, which has often been criticized for its seemingly arbitrary
denials of relief,64 becomes helpful as a worst-case scenario to demon-
strate how a nonresident alien beneficiary may persuade a court to
reach the cases' merits. Standing should be evident once the nonresi-
dent alien beneficiary asserts the decedent's constitutional rights.65
The guideposts for standing are: (1) that the plaintiffs have an in-
jury in fact; (2) that the injury in fact be fairly traceable to the chal-
lenged policy; and (3) that the injury in fact has redressibility by the
remedy sought.6 In the context of nonresident alien beneficiaries chal-
lenging death benefit statutes, the injury in fact is the deprivation of
tens of thousands of dollars in death benefits. The deprivation is
"fairly traceable" to the death benefit statutes, as they directly au-
thorize loss of benefits based on alienage and residency. And finally,
courts can easily redress the discrimination by striking the statutes as
violations of equal protection and other guarantees .67
In addition to advocating standing under the derivative rights analy-
sis outlined in De Ayala," another possible argument to confer stand-
ing is a "nexus theory." 69 This approach contends that the alienage
statutes, by providing at least a limited recovery, establish a connec-
tion between the nonresident beneficiaries and the deceased worker
sufficient to bring the claimants within the purview of equal protec-
tion.70 Compared to asserting the derivative constitutional rights of
the worker, however, the nexus argument is a poor substitute. 7' While
64. Abram Chayes, The Supreme Court 1981 Term-Foreword: Public Law Litigation and
the Burger Court, 96 HA v. L. REv. 4, 22-23 (1982) (noting that federal standing law has been
criticized as little more than a "litany" used before "the Court ... chooses up sides and decides
the case"); see also 4 KENNETH DAvis, ADMNISTRATrVE LAW TREATISE § 24:35, at 342 (2d ed.
1983) (finding standing law "permeated with sophistry"); Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 129
(1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (describing standing law as "a word game played by secret
rules").
65. See supra notes 49-63 and accompanying text.
66. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. 2130, 2136 (1992); see also Valley Forge
Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464,
472 (1982); Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 37-38 (1976); Warth v.
Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498-500 (1975); Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 616-17 (1973).
67. See De Ayala v. Florida Farm Bureau Casualty Ins., 543 So. 2d 204 (Fla. 1989); Jurado
v. Popejoy, 853 P.2d 669 (Kan. 1993).
68. See supra notes 49-58 and accompanying text.
69. Jalifi v. Industrial Comm'n, 644 P.2d 1319, 1321 n.2 (Ariz. Ct. App.), appeal dis-
missed, 459 U.S. 899 (1982).
70. Id.
71. See id. at 1319 (approving nexus theory to grant plaintiffs standing, yet rejecting the
statutory challenge on rational relationship grounds).
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the nexus theory acknowledges nonresident aliens may assert their
rights as dependents to collect death benefits, its central weakness is
that these rights do not include those of the deceased worker. 72 With-
out the ability to assert the worker's immutable constitutional guaran-
tees, the nexus theory implicitly accepts legislative discretion to grant,
limit, or abolish the rights of nonresident beneficiaries." In light of its
tenuous nature and inability to attach firmly to the worker decedent's
rights, the nexus argument should yield to the theory that nonresident
alien dependents may derivatively enforce the deceased worker's con-
stitutional rights.
3. Classifications Based on Alienage are Suspect Classifications
Requiring Strict Scrutiny
Once an equal protection 74 challenge to statutes denying death bene-
fits is analyzed on its merits, courts must decide whether to apply ra-
tional basis," intermediate," 6 or strict scrutiny review.77 Equal
Protection Clause jurisprudence reveals that strict scrutiny is war-
ranted in cases where the legislative classification infringes on a fun-
damental right or is based on "suspect classifications" such as race or
alienage. 78 Because the statutes denying equal death benefits distin-
72. Alvarez Martinez v. Industrial Comm'n, 720 P.2d 416, 419 (Utah 1986) (holding the
state's partial payment of benefits to a nonresident alien beneficiary does not establish a nexus
sufficient to bring the plaintiff within constitutional bounds).
73. Id, ("[Ilf the state were to grant no death benefits to nonresident aliens whatsoever,
there would be no nexus and no denial of equal protection."); Pedrazza v. Sid Fleming Contrac-
tor, Inc., 607 P.2d 597, 601 (N.M. 1980) ("A dependent's claim is not derivative of the worker,
but is given [to] him by statute independent of the worker.").
74. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
75. Under rational basis review, a statute will be upheld if its classifications are "rationally
related" to a legitimate governmental purpose. See, e.g., New York City Transit Auth. v, Be-
azer, 440 U.S. 568 (1979) (applying rational relationship standard to Transit Authority hiring
practice); Washington v. Yakima Indian Nation, 439 U.S. 463, 501 (1979) ("[L]egislative classi-
fications are valid unless they bear no rational relationship to the State's objectives.").
76. Under intermediate scrutiny review, often associated with gender-based classifications,
courts will uphold legislation which bears a "substantial relationship" to "important govern-
mental objectives." Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
77. Under strict scrutiny review, a classification will be upheld only if it "advance[s] a com-
pelling state interest by the least restrictive means available." Bernal v. Fainter, 467 U.S. 216,
219(1984).
78. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971). Graham concerns a constitutional
challenge to state statutes disqualifying aliens from welfare assistance. Id. at 367. The Court held
that "classifications based on alienage, like those based on nationality or race, are inherently
suspect." Id. at 372. Applying strict scrutiny to the challenged statutes, the Court found that the
"State's desire to preserve limited welfare benefits for its own citizens is inadequate to justify
.. . making noncitizens ineligible for public assistance." Id. at 374. Nonresident aliens asserting
the constitutional rights of the decedent worker should fall easily within Graham's constitutional
protection on grounds that they are seeking benefits which have already inured to them through"
the decedent's right to workers' compensation.
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guish on the basis of alienage, strict scrutiny is the appropriate stan-
dard of review. 9
For a statute to survive strict scrutiny, it must be necessary to serve
a compelling governmental interest.8 0 When this standard is applied to
statutes denying full benefits, the governmental interest falls short of
"compelling." For instance, one of the justifications for upholding
the statutes has been that denying death benefits to nonresident alien
beneficiaries will prevent dependents from becoming public charges in
the United States.8 When one considers, however, that nonresident
U.S. citizens (i.e., Americans living abroad) are entitled to the same
statutory maximums available to beneficiaries who live in the United
States, the hollowness of the justification becomes evident. In addi-
tion, many of the statutes denying recovery to nonresident alien bene-
ficiaries make an exception for Canadian beneficiaries, allowing them
to receive benefits equal to resident U.S. beneficiaries.8 2 There is no
compelling interest in preventing Canadians from becoming public
charges in Canada that would not similarly suffice for other nonresi-
dent aliens, such as Mexicans living in Mexico. 83 If the governmental
interest in reducing the number of public charges in the United States
were compelling, full death benefits would be restricted to only one
type of beneficiary-those living in the United States-rather than ex-
tended to Canadian and U.S. beneficiaries living abroad.
Proponents of the public charge argument may claim that full pay-
ment to Americans living abroad is justified because those citizens
may permanently return to the United States-an option nonresident
aliens cannot exercise-and potentially become public charges. This
rationale is questionable, however, because none of the workers' com-
pensation statutes reduces the nonresident U.S. beneficiary's death
benefit by an amount commensurate to the time spent abroad."
Another interest not sufficient to survive strict scrutiny analysis is
that of preventing nonresident alien beneficiaries from monetary
windfalls. While it is true that the cost of living is less in some coun-
79. Id. at 372; see also Bernal, 467 U.S. at 219.
80. See supra note 77.
81. See supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text.
82. Jalifi v. Industrial Comm'n, 644 P.2d 1319, 1322 (Ariz. Ct. App.), appeal dismissed,
459 U.S. 899 (1982).
83. Regarding Georgia's workers' compensation system, which grants up to $100,000 in
death benefits to Canadian citizens but limits death benefits to only $1,000 for all other nonresi-
dent aliens, one commentator stated: "It's a racist statute, simple as that. Canadians look more
like us, and Mexicans don't." Telephone Interview with Norman J. Slawsky, lawyer and amicus
curiae for the deceased worker's family in Barge-Wagener Constr. Co. v. Morales, 429 S.E.2d
671 (Ga.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 579 (1993).
84. See Appendix to this Comment.
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tries than it is in the United States, in other countries the cost of living
is the same or greater than that in the United States. Japan, for exam-
ple, is infamous for its high food and housing costs." In Mexico, con-
sumer prices rose 131.8% during 1986-1987, compared to only a 3.7%
increase in U.S. consumer prices during the same period.8 6 Further un-
derscoring the statutes' less-than-compelling classifications is the fact
that the statutes do not require Americans living abroad-especially
those who reside in countries with a low cost of living-to suffer a
similar reduction in benefits.1
7
In addition to the governmental interests mentioned above, admin-
istrative convenience similarly does not constitute a compelling justifi-
cation for discriminating on the basis of alienage. Today's technology
easily tackles administrative barriers to processing claims, as evi-
denced by the success insurance companies have when they regularly
locate foreign beneficiaries through a consular office to present them
a check for diminished death benefits.8 8 As one state supreme court
recently concluded:
[The] difficulty of establishing a dependent's entitlement to benefits
is not a difficulty of the State. . . . [T~he contention that
administration of benefits would be an 'insurmountable task' may
have been viable in 1911 [when the state's death benefit statute was
enacted]. However, given the global economy within which we work,
the task has become lesg difficult over the past 80 years. 9
B. Supremacy Clause
The U.S. Constitution provides that a duly ratified treaty made by
the United States "shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the
Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Consti-
tution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding." 90 This
85. Harry Levinson, Japan: Working Like Crazy, CHRISTIAN SCI. MoNrrOR, Dec. 6, 1990,
at 19; Tom Ashbrook, Tokyo Tour: Land of the $50 Melon, BOSTON GLOBE, May 26, 1986, at
C3.
86. International Financial Statistics, International Monetary Fund, Washington, D.C. In
1992, consumer prices in Mexico were rising at three times the rate of U.S. consumer prices.
1994 Tua WORLD ALMANAC AND BOOK OF FACTS 103, 789 (Robert Famighetti ed., 1993).
87. See Appendix to this Comment.
88. See infra notes 145-48 and accompanying text.
89. Jurado v. Popejoy Constr. Co., 853 P.2d 669, 677 (Kan. 1993).
90. U.S. CONST. art. VI.
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provision, an integral part of the Supremacy Clause,9 may be used to
invalidate a state's attempt to deny death benefits to nonresident alien
dependents. The applicability of the Supremacy Clause is limited,
however, to those cases where the nonresident alien dependent is from
a country which has signed a reciprocity treaty with the United States
granting citizens from each country a right of action under the other
country's legal system.
When applying the language of a treaty to a particular case, courts
use a liberal construction to carry out the intent of the contracting
parties and secure equality between them. 93 The interpretation of a
treaty may not, however, infringe upon the U.S. Constitution or "in-
vade the province of the States of the Union in matters inherently lo-
cal, or ... restrict the various states in the exercise of their sovereign
powers." 94 With these interpretive boundaries in mind, a treaty which
seemingly grants reciprocal rights between citizens of the United
States and the claimant's country may nevertheless be parsed into
pieces to foreclose recovery. 9
An example of how narrowly treaties may be construed is Liberato
v. Royer,9 where the Court denied death benefits to the Italian de-
pendents of a worker killed in Pennsylvania.Y The Pennsylvania stat-
ute denied all death benefits to nonresident alien beneficiaries, and the
plaintiffs sued on grounds that the state statute violated the Treaty of
1913 signed by the United States and Italy.98 Despite the treaty afford-
91. The full text of the Supremacy Clause reads as follows:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursu-
ance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of
the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every state
shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the
Contrary notwithstanding.
Id.
92. See Alvarez Martinez v. Industrial Comm'n, 720 P.2d 416, 417 (Utah 1986) (finding no
violation of the Supremacy Clause because Mexico and the United States have not entered into a
treaty extending to Mexican nationals the same rights and privileges under United States work-
ers' compensation laws as to United States citizens). See generally 16 AM. Jur. 2D Constitutional
Law § 75 (1964).
93. Bacardi Corp. v. Domenech, 311 U.S. 150, 163 (1940); Hauenstein v. Lynham, 100
U.S. 487 (1879); see United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 230-31 (1942).
94. Antosz v. State Compensation Comm'r, 43 S.E.2d 397, 400 (W. Va. 1947).
95. See 2A ARTHuR LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 63.52, at 11-185
(1989) ("The exact scope and terms of the treaty must be carefully examined to determine
whether compensation discrimination is violative of its guarantees.").
96. 270 U.S. 535 (1926).
97. Id. at 538.
98. Id. at 537. The treaty reads:
The citizens of each of the High Contracting Parties shall receive in the States and
Territories of the other the most constant security and protection for their persons and
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ing citizens of both countries "the most constant security and protec-
tion," the Court read out any claim to death benefits from the
language "establish [ing] a civil responsibility for injuries or for death
caused by negligence or fault."99
Twenty-one years after Liberato, however, the West Virginia Su-
preme Court decided Antosz v. State Compensation Commissioner,°0
which involved a Polish national who sued for death benefits on Su-
premacy Clause grounds after her husband was killed in a coal mining
accident.' °0 In granting compensation, the court emphasized that the
treaty between the United States and Poland established civil liabilities
for injuries or for death, and that these civil liabilities gave to depend-
ents "a right of action or a pecuniary benefit ... regardless of their
alienage or residence outside of the territory where the injury occurred
.... ,,10 The court distinguished Micaz v. Compensation Commis-
sioner and another case construing the Italy-United States treaty'03 by
noting that unlike the Polish treaty, which expressly provided for pe-
cuniary benefits, the Italian treaty "simply established 'a civil respon-
sibility for injuries or for death caused by negligence or fault and
gives to relatives or heirs of the injured [or deceased] party a right of
action. . .. "',,o
Recently, the New York Court of Appeals construed the 1953
Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation between Japan and
the United States in favor of a Japanese mother seeking death benefits
after her son was stabbed to death at his employer's headquarters.' 05
The New York Workers' Compensation Law attempted to deny death
benefit eligibility to the parents due to the law's prohibition on com-
pensation to those who were supported by their children for less than
property and for their rights, including that form of protection granted by any State
or national law which establishes a civil responsibility for injuries or for death caused
by negligence or fault and gives to relatives or heirs of the injured party a right of
action, which right shall not be restricted on account of the nationality of said rela-
tives or heirs; and shall enjoy in this respect the same rights and privileges as are or
shall be granted to nationals, provided that they submit themselves to the conditions
imposed on the latter.
Treaty on Commerce and Navigation, Feb. 25, 1913, U.S. -Italy, art. I, 38 Stat. 1669, 1670 [here-
inafter Commerce].
99. Liberato v. Royer, 270 U.S. 535, 538 (1926).
100. 43 S.E.2d 397 (1947).
101. Id. at 398-99.
102. Id. at 400, 398.
103. Antosz v. State Compensation Comm'r, 43 S.E.2d at 400 (construing MicaZ v. State
Compensation Comm'r, 13 S.E.2d 161 (W. Va. 1941)).
104. Id. (quoting Commerce, supra note 98).
105. Mizugami v. Sharin W. Overseas Inc., 615 N.E.2d 964, 965 (N.Y. 1993).
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one year.106 The court, however, considered the "ordinary meaning
and clear import" of the treaty and concluded states "are required to
accord 'national treatment' equally to foreign nationals and United
States citizens in these circumstances. '"0 7 Like the United States-Po-
land treaty, the United States-Japan treaty contained language stating
that the citizens of each country would be provided "pecuniary com-
pensation.' '" ° This phrase was not in the United States-Italy treaty at
issue in Liberato, and its endorsement by state courts indicates that
states will welcome it as a vehicle for extending death benefits to non-
resident alien beneficiaries.' °9
III. AccEss TO COURTS
Historically, workers' compensation statutes have survived judicial
scrutiny because they provide a sufficient quid pro quo to employers
and employees." 0 That is, in exchange for guaranteed and speedy
compensation, an injured employee or the estate of a deceased em-
ployee gives up the common law right to sue the employer for negli-
gence or wrongful death."' By agreeing to compensate workers
injured in job-related accidents regardless of fault, employers give up
the "unholy trinity" defenses of assumption of risk, contributory neg-
ligence, and the fellow servant doctrine."' Workers' compensation is
fundamentally different from tort liability because tort liability is
based on a system of fault, while workers' compensation is based on
whether the employee's injury arose out of and in the course of em-
ployment. "1 Unlike tort liability, workers' compensation "is a mecha-
nism for providing cash wage benefits and medical care to victims of
106. Id. at 966.
107. Id. at 967. The Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation provides:
Nationals of either Party [the United States and Japan] shall be accorded national
treatment in the application of laws and regulations within the territories of the other
Party that establish a pecuniary compensation, or other benefit or service, on account
of disease, injury or death arising out of and in the course of employment or due to
the nature of employment.
Id. at 966.
108. See supra notes 102-04 and accompanying text.
109. Compare Antosz v. State Compensation Comm'r, 43 S.E.2d at 397 (providing a "pecu-
niary benefit" under the treaty) and Mizugami, 615 N.E.2d at 965 (providing "pecuniary com-
pensation" under the treaty) with Liberato v. Royer, 270 U.S. 535 (1926) (failing to provide any
"pecuniary" recovery under the treaty).
110. See ARTHuR LARSON, The Nature and Origins of Workmen's Compensation, 37 COR-
NELL L.Q. 206 (1952) [hereinafter Larson, Nature].
111. RicHAD A. EPSTEtN, The Historical Origins and Economic Structure of Worker's
Compensation Law, 16 GA. L. Rav. 775 (1982).
112. See W. KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON TIE LAW OF TORTS § 80 at 569 (5th ed.
i984).
113. Larson, supra note 37, § 1.02.
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work-connected injuries, and for placing the cost of these injuries ulti-
mately on the consumer, through the medium of insurance, whose
premiums are passed on in the cost of the product." '" 4
Despite the general validity of workers' compensation, however,
statutes which mandate unequal death benefits for nonresident benefi-
ciaries take away dependents' quid pro quo by stripping them of re-
covery and leaving them without remedy in law or equity.' To
counter such restrictions, a nonresident alien may turn to "open
courts" provisions in state constitutions to argue that the statutes vio-
late the individual's right to access the judicial system. Most state con-
stitutions have "open courts" language, which provides that justice
will be administered to all without delay and the courts will always be
open to aggrieved parties."'
Lack of standing, however, can easily defeat an argument based on
access to courts." 7 In this respect, state courts wield tremendous
power over the construction of workers' compensation statutes which,
hailing from a different era, continue to discriminate against nonresi-
dent workers. An example of how an access-to-courts argument can
be raised in the parties' briefs, put forth at oral argument, yet appear
nowhere in the final opinion is Barge-Wagener Construction Co. v.
Morales."" In Morales, the Georgia Supreme Court upheld the valid-
ity of Georgia's $1,000 cap on death benefits payable to nonresident
alien beneficiaries. " 9 After concluding the right to death benefits vests
in dependents only after the worker dies, the court stated that the stat-
ute "surely discriminates against [the nonresident alien beneficiaries],
but it is not unlawful. They must settle for what the legislature of this
state is willing to provide."' 20
If Morales were to have concluded like De Ayala that the right to
death benefits inures directly with the decedent worker,' 2' Georgia's
''open courts" doctrine might have compelled at least a discussion of
the beneficiaries' case on this point. 22 Georgia's "open courts" provi-
sion states that "no person shall be deprived of the right to prosecute
or defend, either in person or by an attorney, that person's own cause
114. Larson, Nature. supra note 110, at 207.
115. See supra notes 110-14 and accompanying text.
116. See 16A AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 613, at 557-58 (1962).
117. See supra notes 13-31 and accompanying text.
118. 429 S.E.2d 671 (Ga.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 579 (1993).
119. Id. at 674.
120. Id. at 673.
121. See supra notes 49-58 and accompanying text.
122. After the court concluded that the Equal Protection Clause did not extend to the plain-
tiff beneficiaries, the merits of the claimants' access to courts argument were not addressed.
Morales, 429 S.E.2d at 673.
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in any of the courts of this state." 23 The key consideration, which the
Georgia Supreme Court rejected but which the Florida Supreme Court
embraced, is that the right to death benefit compensation is the work-
er's own cause advanced by beneficiaries.' 24
Many of the seventeen states which curtail death benefits for non-
resident alien beneficiaries have "open courts" provisions. 23 As more
challenges to the statutes' validity are raised, these provisions will
serve as important tools for obtaining judicial relief. The inadequacy
of the $1,000 death benefit upheld in Morales is reflected by the fact
that the Georgia Legislature set the $1,000 limit more than seventy
years ago and has continuously failed to raise it.126 The original Geor-
gia workers' compensation act provided up to $4,000 for resident de-
pendents and $1,000 for nonresident dependents. 27 Although the
Georgia Legislature amended the statute a dozen times to increase
benefits for resident dependents, the compensation for nonresident
alien dependents has yet to be raised.' 2
A. Societal Benefits of Using Access-to-Court Arguments for
Nonresident Alien Beneficiaries
The access-to-courts argument is particularly compelling when the
consequences of not permitting dependents to assert their claims are
considered. Workers' compensation systems serve two key societal in-
terests in addition to the advantages employers and employees enjoy
under the labor arrangement.2 9 First, workers' compensation encour-
ages employer interest in safety and rehabilitation through an appro-
priate experience-rating system that affects insurance rates. 30 Second,
it promotes frank study of the causes of accidents to help keep prev-
entable ones from occurring. ' ' Workers' compensation programs pro-
vide employers with preventative services, including safety
engineering, while the structure of insurance premiums serves as a pri-
123. GA. CONST., art. I, § 1, XII (emphasis added).
124. See De Ayala v. Florida Farm Bureau Casualty, Ins., 543 So. 2d 204 (Fla. 1989); see
also Jurado v. Popejoy Constr. Co., 853 P.2d 669 (Kan. 1993).
125. See, e.g., ALA. CONST. art. I, § 13; ARK. CONST. art. 11, § 13; DEL. CONST. art. I, § 9;
ILL. CONST. art. II, § 12; ME. Cowsr. art. I, § 19; N.C. CoNsT. art. I, § 35; OR. CONST. art. I, §
10; PA. CONST. art. I, § 11; S.C. CONST. art. I. § 15.
126. See 1929 Ga. Laws 38; GA. CODE ANN. § 34-9-265(d) (1993).
127. 1929 Ga. Laws 38.
128. See GA. CODE ANN. § 34-9-265(b)(5) (1993).
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mary monetary incentive for employers to improve their safety re-
cords. 1 2
The financial incentive for employers who employ a large number
of aliens to comply with safety and health regulations is destroyed,
however, by states that allow employers and their insurance compa-
nies to deny death benefits to nonresident alien beneficiaries. Indeed,
a perverse situation arises under these statutes whereby an injured em-
ployee may receive tens of thousands of dollars in injury compensa-
tion, but the beneficiaries of that same employee will suffer a severe
reduction in benefits if the employee is killed on the job. In this re-
spect, states with discriminatory death benefit statutes are essentially
underwriting employers and their insurance companies by valuing em-
ployee deaths as an incidental cost of doing business. An Alabama
employer, for example, may not have any incentive to improve work-
ing conditions because the death of an employee with an alien benefi-
ciary will not impact the employer's insurance policy covering
workplace injury or death beyond the nominal amount paid for burial
expenses.' This type of compensation system emphasizes far too dra-
matically the common law maxim that "it is cheaper to kill a man
than to maim him.'
34
B. The Impact of the Discriminatory Statutes on Farm workers in the
United States
Illustrating the acute impact of these discriminatory statutes are the
estimated 2.5 million farmworkers hired to perform seasonal and mi-
grant labor in the United States.' Of the workers performing sea-
sonal agricultural services (SAS), 62% are foreign-born and more
than half are from Mexico. 3 6 A 1991 staff report from the U.S.
132. ALA. CODE § 25-5-82 (1993).
133. Id.
134. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 945 (5th ed.
1984). Despite the fact that death benefits comprise more than 14% of total income benefits,
"the economic loss associated with death cases is often less than that of a permanent total disa-
bility." See U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, 1993 ANALYSIS OF WOREss' COMPENSATION LAWS 19
(1993).
135. ASSOCIATION OF FARMWORKER OPPORTUNITY PROGRAMS TESTIMONY ON THE NEEDS OF
ELDERLY FARMWORKERS 6 (1990), reprinted in After 30 Years, America's Continuing Harvest of
Shame: Hearing before the House of Representatives Select Committee on Aging, 101st Cong.,
2d Sess. 69 (1990) [hereinafter Harvest of Shame].
"Seasonal farmworkers" are those who work in their home areas without staying away over-
night. "Migrant farmworkers" travel across state lines and stay away from home overnight to
perform agricultural work. 29 U.S.C. § 1802(8)(A) (1988).
136. OFFICE OF PROGRAM ECONOmiCS, U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, NATIONAL AGRICULTURAL
WORKERS SURVEY (NAWS) 1990 15 (1990) [hereinafter NAWS SURVEY]. Two percent of SAS
workers are from other countries in Latin America, 2% are from Asia, and 1% are from the
non-Spanish speaking Caribbean. Id.
WORKERS' COMPENSA TION
House of Representatives Select Committee on Aging described the
situation facing farmworkers:
The average farmworker is employed about 25 weeks per year with
few earning more than $6,000 a year. Their work is physically
demanding, lacking job security, and providing little opportunity for
promotion. [Bjecause many cannot vote due to their undocumented
status, they are disenfranchised and disempowered. Exacerbating the
lack of governmental representation for their concerns, farmworkers
are without an audible voice in either the Nation's agricultural fields
or the Nation's capital.'
Most SAS workers have dependents, yet 40% of them do not live
with their families. 3 ' While agricultural laborers often do not receive
workers' compensation benefits,' 39 many are nevertheless eligible for
workers' compensation because they also perform nonagricultural la-
bor which qualifies under state workers' compensation programs.140
When job-related fatalities occur, the families of these farmworkers
suffer severe hardship from the loss of income and denial of equal
death benefit payments.
IV. SOLUTIONS
Workers' compensation laws in seventeen states have provisions for
reducing the amount of death benefits to nonresident alien depend-
ents.'14 Other states commute the benefits to a lump sum or restrict
the types of dependents eligible as beneficiaries. 42 As part of these
schemes, states have also devised various methods guaranteeing bene-
fit payment, although diminished, and ensuring against fraud.4 3 By
137. STAFF REPORT OF H.R. SELECT COMM. ON AOmo, 102D CONG., IST SESS., Tis STATUS
OF FEDERAL LAWS AFFET ING OuR NATION'S F.awwoRERms 2 (Comm. Print Nov. 1991).
138. NAWS SuRVEY, supra note 136, at ii.
139. Fourteen states exclude agricultural workers from workers' compensation coverage: Al-
abama, Arkansas, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Mississippi, Nebraska, Nevada, New
Mexico, North Dakota, Rhode Island, South Carolina, and Tennessee. Harvest of Shame, supra
note 135, at 191. States that provide workers' compensation coverage for agricultural workers
the same as all other employees are: Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Hawaii,
Louisiana, Massachusetts, Montana, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Ohio, and Oregon. Id. at 91-
92. Washington, D.C. and the Virgin Islands similarly provide the same coverage for agricultural
workers as for other employees. Id. at 92.
140. Thirty-six percent of SAS workers perform non-SAS labor during a one-year period.
NAWS suRvEY, supra note 136, at 77.
141. See Appendix to this Comment.
142. Id.
143. See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-71-724(1) (1993); OR. REv. STAT. § 656.232 (1993);
TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.12 (West 1993); Wis. STAT. § 102.19 (1993).
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looking at the ways states have worked against abuses in the compen-
sation system, several models emerge as states consider implementing
systems which do not discriminate based on alienage. In light of the
Court's recent decision to deny certiorari to a case challenging a
state's cap on death benefits to nonresident alien dependents, .44 the
mechanisms states use to prevent abuses in the compensation system
will become increasingly important to states which change their dis-
criminatory statutes.
One of the ways states try to guarantee delivery of death benefits to
nonresident alien beneficiaries is. by requiring the beneficiaries' consu-
lar office to represent the nonresident alien dependent before receiving
benefit payments.' 45 The insurer may be required to pay death benefits
to the consular office on the beneficiaries' behalf. 14
Similarly, states have ensured against fraudulent death benefit
claims by requiring the dependent to furnish proof of dependency
status, such as a marriage or birth certificate, under seal of a court
officer from the dependent's resident country.' 47 Often, this requires
the consular office of the dependent's country to execute a bond to
guarantee an accounting of the funds received. Before the bond is dis-
charged, a verified statement of receipt and disbursement of the funds
must be made and filed in the circuit court ordering the payment.' 48
By incorporating these types of procedural safeguards, states with dis-
criminatory compensation systems can distribute payments more
fairly and without fear of fraud or abuse.
V. CONCLUSION
As seen from the various types of workers' compensation delivery
systems, states can be creative when finding methods to protect
against fraud yet guarantee delivery of death benefits to the benefici-
aries of employees killed during work-related activity. If states are to
honor the workers' compensation conditions imposed on employers
and employees, they must provide equal compensation to dependents
and beneficiaries without regard to where they are from or where they
live.
144. Barge-Wagener Constr. Co. v. Morales, 429 S.E.2d 671 (Ga.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct.
579 (1993).
145. OR. REv. STAT. § 656.232 (1993); Wis. STAT. § 102.19 (1993).
146. See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-71-724(1) (1993).
147. Id.
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